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disclosures of Reserve Recognition Accounting (RRA). The primary 
objective is to determine whether abnormal stock price behavior· 
occurred contemporaneously with RRA disclosures. The secondary objec-
tive is to assess the various market-study methodologies with regard 
to their applicability in industry-specific analyses of reaction to 
subjective data. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
On August 31, 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 253 entitled "Adoption of 
Requirements for Financial Accounting and Reporting Practices for Oil 
and Gas Producing Activities." The release promulgates certain valu-
ation and income-measurement rules heretofore avoided by accountants 
due to an unacceptable degree of subjectivity inherent in the 
procedures. 
Reserve Recognition Accounting (R~), as ASR No. 253 has come to 
be called, requires the reporting of, among other things, (i) cash flow 
and value of transfers ("net revenue") from estimated future production 
of proved oil and gas reserves, calculated on the basis of current 
economic conditions, and (ii) present value of net revenue from esti-
mated future production of proved oil and gas reserves using a 10 
d . 1 percent iscount rate. The use of a mandatory 10 percent discount rate 
and the use of current price instead of estimated future prices are 
attempts by the SEC to ensure some degree of objectivity. However, 
valuation which is subjective in nature is required when estimating the 
rate and quantities of future production of "proved" reserves. 
1For detailed discussions of the reporting requirements, see 
Adkerson (1979), Conner (1979), and Fraser (1975). 
1 
2 
The accounting literature is replete with arguments concerned with 
the inability of accounting procedures to produce information which is 
sufficiently reliable and relevant. Usually, one characteristic is 
achieved at the expense of the other. Should accountants strive for 
relevance and accept a high degree of subjectivity, or should 
objectivity be of primary concern? 
At least two major studies have been conducted regarding the level 
of subjectivity of RRA numbers. These studies consistently conclude 
that RRA numbers are materially imprecise. The studies reveal that., :.in 
a predominant number of instances, revisions to initial RRA estimates 
are extremely large. An inadequacy of these studies is that the 
characteristic of relevance is ignored. The fact that an initial 
estimate of a future outcome is not very close to the related actual 
result does not preclude the initial estimate from being the most 
relevant measure at the time it is made. If RRA valuations are per-
ceived by market agents as more relevant than historical cost valuations~ 
then the high degree of subjectivity inherent in the RRA numbers will 
not necessarily prevent the market from using them. On the other hand, 
it can be argued that as the degree of subjectivity increases, a point 
may be reached where relevance is jeopardized. The numbers may become 
so unreliable that they are no longer relevant. 
This study provides evidence regarding the market's assessment of 
the relevance of RRA numbers. Specifically, two distinct mandated 
2 di3closures were evaluated: 
Signal Event I: The initial RRA data disclosed in a footnote 
to the 1978 10-K, and 
2Foster ~1980) and Beaver, Christie and Griffen (1980) discuss the 
differences between market reaction to (i) accounting policy decisions 
and (ii) mandated disclosures. 
Signal Event II: The RRA supplemental earnings statement filed 
in the 1979 10-K (the second filing). 
The remainder of Chapter I presents background information on 
the degree of reliability of Reserve Recognition Accounting. A brief 
history of the objectivity vs. relevance debate is also given. 
Chapter II discusses the sample selection techniques and statistical 
methodology employed. An important consideration when performing 
statistical analyses on individual firm disclosures is the level of 
3 
aggregation of the measures being judged. The timing of price reactions 
to RRA data may warrant the use of individual-firm analysis vis-a-vis 
aggregate sample analysis. Chapter III presents the findings of the 
various tests and plottings followed by a summary and concluding 
remar~s in Chapter IV. Limitations and suggested future research are 
also discussed in Chapter IV. 
Reserve Recognition Accounting--
Reliability vs. Relevance 
In an effort to determine theoretically sound income-measurement 
rules, the accounting profession has emphasized the need for both 
relevance and reliability. The AAA Committee to Prepare a Statement of 
Basic Accounting Theory (AAAASOBAT, 1966) chose relevance as the 
primary standard for accounting information. The other th~ee standards 
chosen by the committee--verifiability, freedom from bias,. and 
quantifiability--are implicit in the notion ofreliability. 3 
3Feltham (1972, p. 27) states that "the most relevant information 
may be the least verifiable." 
Alexander (1977) 4 suggests: 
To the extent that the accountant can eliminate guesses, he 
is substituting something else for income. That something 
else will be a good approximation to income in a fairly 
static situation when prices and business prospects are not 
changing very much; in a dynamic situation when prices and 
business prospects are fluctuating violently, the approxi-
mation will be a poor one (p. 39). 
The FASB~ in "Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2" 
(1980), recognizes the trade-off between reliability and relevance of 
accounting information: 
The qualities that distinguish 'better' (more useful) 
information from 'inferior' (less useful) information are 
primarily the qualities of relevance and reliability, with 
some other characteristics that those qualities imply 
(para. 15). 
It may be possible to trade relevance for reliability 
or vice versa, though not to the point of dispensing with 
one of them altogether .•. -(para. 42). 
For many years, accountants have recognized the need for a 
relevant measure of an entity'svalue. As early as 1918, Paton and 
Stevenson (1918) advocated the use of present values for measuring the 
book value of assets, irrespective of whether such values were higher 
or lower than original costs. Hatfield (1927~ p. 80) wrote that "the 
under.valuation of assets, with its accompanyirig understatement of 
profits and establishment of a secret reserve, if the lesser of two 
4 
evils, nevertheless falls far short of the ideal standard of accounting." 
Anderson (1976) categorized several later writers as either subjectivity 
proponents--Alexander (1962), Solomons (1961, 1966)--or objectivity 
4Alexander's original 
one of the Fi'?:e Monographs 
Group on Business Income. 
revision prepared by David 
monograph was given limited circulation as 
on Business Income written for the Study 
The 1962 version of the monograph is a 
Solomons. 
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proponehts--Edwards and Bell (1961), and Sterling (1970). 5 
Until recently the use of present values as measurements of major 
assets has been generally avoided. One common agrument against the use 
of present values is given by Peasnell (1977, p. 188); "Managements are 
placed poorly to calculate their company's PV--to do so they would have 
to monitor the time and risk preferences of investors." On the other 
hand, it can be argu~d that management has a comparative advantage in 
estimating production timing since they are directly responsible for its 
ultimate occurrence. 
The Subjectivity of RRA Data 
The SEC, through ASR No. 253, has required the use of a measure of 
value which is hoped to be more relevant although it is admittedly 
less precise. ASR No. 253 states: 
The Commission has concluded that supplemental disclosure of 
valuation information on oil and gas reserves in accordance 
with its newly adopted rules is appropriate even though the 
information cannot be precisely determined (1972, p. 3691). 
Criticizing the traditional historical-cost based net income, Clarence 
Sampson, the SEC's Chief Accountant at the time of adoption of RRA, 
stated, "The present net-income statements of oil and gas companies show 
the true results of operations only by coincidence" (Stuart, 1979, 
.P· 72). 6 
· Disagreement over the propriety of RRA's subjective valuations is 
clearly evidenced by the following excerpt from Kolbenschlag (1979): 
5 
Sprouse (1966) could also be categorized as a proponent of 
objectivity. 
6 seidler suggests, "RRA •.• will provide the typical investor 
and portfolio manager with information not now provided" (Business Week, 
October 1, 1979, p. 56), and Fraser (1979, p. 106) states, ''From the 
s~an_dpoint of the financial analysts, R..1'.A makes good sense ... " 
An unusually viscous and vicious alliance of the U.S. oil 
industry's producers, accountants, and analysts have tried 
mightily to kill the beast [RRA] after its first appearance 
in the supplements to 1978 oil company 10-K's filed with 
the SEC last June [RRA added] (p. 188). 
Connor (1979) and Porter (1980) have studied: 
..• the impact of the subjectivity factor involved in 
reserve estimation to determine if it is of such magnitude 
that it yields an imprecision that limits in any way the 
method or manner in which reserve information should be 
utilized in the financial reporting process (Porter, 1980, 
p. 1) • 
In essence, both studies conclude that RRA produces results which are 
materially imprecise when compared with subsequent actual results. 
Connor (1979, p. 94) states, "The theoretical viability of RRA is 
critically imparied by the reality of the inherent imprecision of 
initial.estimates of reserves and future development and production 
activities." 
The Porter and Connor studies found that initial estimates of 
proven reserves could be very unreliable. Porter (1980) analyzed the 
revisions of proven reserves for a sample of 26 firms. Some of the 
results are given below .. 
1. All of the 26 companies reporting changes in total company 
reserves reported a revision of prior reserve estimates in every year. 
2. Of the revisions made to company reserves over the period 1969 
through 1978, 64 percent of the annual revisions were greater than 
20 percent of the companies' annual additions to proved reserved; 
46 percent of the annual revisions were greater than 40 percent of the 
companies' annual additions to proved reserves. 
3. All except five of the participating companies had revisions 
in at least one year in excess of 100 percent of additions. Sixteen 
companies had revisions in at least one year in excess of 140 percent 
of additions. 
6 
Connor (1979) also found discovery date estimates of proven 
reserves to be highly inaccurate. "Discussion with participants in 
the study indicate that the inaccuracy of discovery date estimates of 
reserves quantities frequently ranges from ±15 percent to ±85 percent 
7 
or more" (p. 95). The petroleum engineers who prepare reserve estimates 
are quick to warn of the subjectivity involved. "It's like inventorying 
a warehouse," says one expert, "except that you're blind; you don't know 
how big or how full the warehouse is, or how much you can get out--or if 
any of the aisles are blocked" (Stuart, 1979, p. 71). Porter (1980) 
compared estimates of proved reserves made by different estimators 
using the same data base. For 323 comparisons of judgment, in 42 per-
cent of the cases the estimates of the companies differed by amounts 
in excess of ±50 percent, and in 21 percent of the cases the differences 
were greater than ±100 percent. 
In short, there is ample evidence suggesting that estimates of 
reserve quantities are highly unreliable. However, if the information 
is superior to other estimates available to the market, an impact on 
securities prices might result from RRA disclosures. 
The Connor and Porter studies highlight the imprecision inherent 
in RRA valuations. However, the studies failed to address the question, 
"Is the data more relevant to investors than the currently available 
historical cost data?" This study investigates the stock price behavior 
of firms filing RRA data. Evidence of abnormal return behavior around. 
the first two RRA filing dates would indicate that the RRA disclosures 
represented incremental information to investors. The methodology used 
to assess the return behavior of RRA firms is discussed next. Although 
this study does not attempt to make inferences about price reactions to 
information with varying degrees of subjectivity, an understanding of 
the effects of subjectivity on price behavior will facilitate the 
construction of a methodology best suited for the data . 
8 
CHAPTER II 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
In order to achieve some control over the effects of industry-
specific events, two samples were drawn. A treatment sample was 
chosen consisting of firms that filed the RRA data for the fiscal years 
ended December 31, 1978 and/or 1979. A control sample consisted of 
firms that filed 1978 and 1979 RRA data for fiscal years ending at times 
other than December 31. The time lag in filing dates for the two 
samples permitted intersample comparisons while at the same time 
ensuring some degree of similarity between the two. Both samples' 
security returns should concurrently reflect the effects of industry-
specif ic events other than RRA. Divergence between the returns of the 
two samples should represent firm-specific phenomena. The firms within 
the control sample were also used to construct an industry index which 
was included as an additional explanatory variable in the individual-
firm abnormal return models. The time lag of RRA disclosures between 
the treatment and control samples should prevent the removal 
of RRA effects from the abnormal returns of treatment firms. 
The samples were drawn f~om a listing of firms on the CRSP daily 
returns file which were classified under any of the following SIC 
Industry Codes, and filed RRA data in at least one of the two years· 
1978.and 1979: 
9 
1311 
1321 
1381 
1382 
2911 
2912 
2992 
2999 
4922 
4923 
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Natural Gas Liquids 
Drilling Oil and Gas Wells 
Oil and Gas Field Services 
Petroleum Refining 
Oil Integrated Domestic 
Lubricating Oils and Greases 
Products of Petroleum and Coal, Not Elsewhere Classified 
Natural Gas Transmission and Storage 
Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution 
The daily returns file was used for two reasons. The file contains 
firms traded on both the NYSE and AMEX (many smaller oil and gas firms 
are traded on AMEX). Also, use of the daily returns file for investi-
gating stock price reactions increases the chances of detecting a 
short-lived reaction. 
In order to ascertain the filing dates of the RRA data, .the 
Disclosures, Inc. 10-K microfiche was used. The filing date was 
determined as the date the SEC stamped "Received" on the front page 
1 
of the 10-K. For the initial 1978 RRA filing, the SEC granted an 
extension of 90 days. ·Many firms filed the RRA data in a separate 
Form 8 submitted well after the initial 10-K filing for 1978. Use of 
10 
these "late filers" in drawing inferences reduces the probability of 
confounding effects due to incremental 10-K information.·2 For the year 
1979, possible incremen.tal 10-K effects are controlled by use of an 
expectations model and by examining returns several days after the 
filing. Any 10-K information which is not as subjective as the RRA 
1Baskin (1972) pointed out that the date annual reports are 
ultimately received by regulatory organizations can lag the information 
release date. Analysts may be apprised of the information sometime near 
the date the reports are mailed, but they may not reach their destina-
tion for several days. For this reason, a range of several days is 
c·onsidered the filing date in some of the tests conducted. This will be 
discussed later in the "Methodology" section. 
2see Foster and Vickrey (1978) for evidence regarding incremental 
information effects of 10-K filings. 
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data should be absorbed more quickly into security prices. 3 
The sample selection criteria resulted in the selection of 87 
treatment firms for 1978 (51 of the firms filed a Form 8 after the 10-K 
filing) and 83 treatment firms for 1979. The control samples include 
21 and 22 control firms for 1978 and 1979, respectively. The treatment 
firms are listed in Appendix A accompanied by individual ·firm statistics 
to be discussed later. The control firms are listed in Appendix B. 
Methodology 
The usual procedure for estimating abnormal stock returns is to 
use the difference between an actual return R. and a predicted return it 
R. . R. is computed using estimators derived from a simple linear it it 
time series regression of firm returns on some index measuring movement 
of the entire stock market. The sole use of a market index as the 
explanatory variable may be appropriate when assessing the impact of 
some inter-industry phenomenon. Industry effects would be mitigated 
through diversification. When assessing the impact of an intra-industry 
4 phenomenon, inclusion of an industry index may be warranted. Beaver 
(1981) recognized: 
. • concern would arise where the industry composition 
differs considerably from that of the market portfolio. 
For example, consider recent .studies of the oil and gas 
industry (Dyckman [1977] and Collins and Dent [1978]). 
One way to deal with industry effects is to extract R. 
and examine only u. (p. 179). it it 
For these reasons, a dual-index model of the following form was 
used to measure abnormal return behavior in this study. 
3A discussion of the rapidity of price adjustments, dependent on the 
subjectivity of information, is given later based on Verrecchia (1980). 
4Foster (1975) included an industry index when investigating 
phenomena specific to the insurance industry. 
R. it 
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(1) 
The industry index Eit is orthogonal to the market index Rmt to ensure 
maximum efficiency of the ordinary least squares estimators, should the 
5 index be an irrelevant variable in the model. The industry index is 
computed as: 
(2) 
where Rit an equally weighted index of firm returns for oil and gas 
companies other than companies in the treatment sample~ and 
= a predicted industry equally weighted index using estimators 
derived from a time series simple linear regression of 
Rit on R • mt, 
The significance of including an industry index is assessed by testing 
the hypothesis S2 = 0. A measure of the incremental utility of the 
industry index is given by the change in R2 due to inclusion of sit" 
In general, the industry index was found to be significant (see 
Chapter III, Findings). 
Scholes and Williams (1977) showed that use of daily returns may 
cause a bias due to non-trading days. For this reason, the multiple 
regression given in equation (1) was run using only days when an actual 
6 trade took place. Also, non-trade days were excluded from the test 
5 Kennedy (1979) states that if an irrelevant variable is included 
in the model, the vector of estimated coefficients, §, and the estimator 
of its variance-covariance matrix remains unbiased. "Unless the irrele-
vant variable is orthogonal to the other independent variables, however, 
the var~ance-covariance matrix becomes larger: the OLS estimates are 
not as efficient" (p. 58). 
6 . 
Scholes and Williams (1977) provide an instrumental variables 
technique designed to transform the coefficients from a regression 
using daily data t~ non-biased status. Unfortunately, the transforma-
tions only apply to a and S from a simple linear regression. It should 
be noted that a problem still exists when using transformed non-biased 
estimators. A non-trade day may occur during the test period. The 
13 
period measures of abnormal returns. If the signal (disclosure) date 
was a non-trade day, the first trade day following the signal date was 
considered the first day of the test period. 
The regression period used to estimate a, s1 and B2 is comprised of 
the 150 days prior to January 15 of each year 1978 and 1979, exclusive 
of non-trade dates. The event period for each firm included 15 days 
prior to the disclosure date through 30 days after the disclosure date. 
Days when no trades took place were not included as elements of the 
46 day event periods. 
Aggregate vs. Individual Firm Analysis 
Most market impact studies use an aggregated abnormal return 
measure to test whether a widespread market reaction occurred among 
the treatment firms. The period over which the test statistic is 
aggregated usually involves identical periods related to the phenomenon 
expected to cause the reaction. These trade periods are not necessarily 
the same calendar periods for all firms. 7 Verrecchia (1980, p. 67) has 
shown that, "because there is a cost involved in processing information, 
investors will not [necessarily] react instantaneously and/or simul-
taneously to the [dissemination of] information." Applying an equili-
brium strategy within the context of a two-person strictly competitive 
abnormal return would be measured as the negative of the predicted return, 
even though no trade took place. If one argues that an abnormal return 
was actually experienced because a return was expected due to market 
movement, then the question b~comes, Why does a non-trade day, when 
measured as a zero return, create a bias? Also, if it creates a bias, 
then why don't trade days where there is no price change create a bias? 
7 For example, a study using daily data might aggregate returns. of 
N number of firms for five days including a disclosure date and four 
subs~quent trading days. However, the firms may disclose on different 
days thus causing a difference in the cal~ndar dates. 
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(zero sum) game, Verrecchia (1980, p. 87) concludes that "as the precision 
associated with information increases, the rapidity of price adjustments 
to the information will increase correspondingly." In addition, 
preliminary evidence suggests that security returns of small and large 
firms differ. Atiase (1979) found that the degree of security price 
revaluation in response to second quarter earnings reports is inversely 
related to the capitalized value of the firm. Banz (1979) shows that 
investors demand higher returns for investments in small firms than in 
large firms. 8 These studies suggest that highly subjective information 
(information which is costly to process) will not necessarily be 
reflected instantaneously and simultaneously in security prices and 
that the degree of price reaction will depend to some extent on the size 
of the firm. If these notions are accepted, then the usual test method 
of aggregating firm returns for a given trading day may not be appro-
priate. Simonds and Collins {1978, p. 650) recognized that much of the 
line of business reporting effect present in the individual returns of 
reporting firms "might be obfuscated when securities are combined 
into portfolios." 
RRA data are regarded as highly imprecise, or subjective data, as 
previously discussed. Also, the sample of treatment firms is comprised 
of a wide range of firm sizes. For these reasons, aggregation of daily 
returns for a specific set of trade days may result in inconclusive 
findings. If treatment firms' security prices react to the subjective 
data at varying times around the information release date, and if 
larger firms' prices react more subtly than smaller firms' prices, 
aggregation by trade day will tend to obscure any widespread reaction. 
8 See Freeman (1981) for a discussion.of the "size effect" on 
security prices. 
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For these reasons an individual firm-by-firm analysis of return 
behavior is conducted in this study, as well as aggregate analyses. 
Individual Firm Analysis 
For each separate firm, the dual-index regression was run, and the 
resultant parameters were used to generate predicted returns for 15 days 
prior to the disclosure date, the disclosure date, and 30 days after 
the disclosure date. The daily abnormal returns were then measured as 
the actual daily returns minus the predicted returns. Prediction 
intervals were then computed around each predicted daily return from 
two days prior to the disclosure date through 30 days after the date. 
The prediction interval is similar to a confidence interval and is 
given by: 
A 
where R. it = the predicted daily return computed using the dual-inde~ 
estimators and actual values of the market and industry 
indices, 
(3) 
the tabular t value for T-3 degrees of freedom, where T 
is the number of observations in the original time series 
regression (150 observations were used in this study), 
1-A. 
se. 
J_ 
where s 2 
the desired confidence level (95 percent in this study), 
and 
the estimated standard error of regression prediction 
errors for firm i, given by: 
se. 
1 
estimated variance of the regression, 
[l, Rmt' ct]' a lx3 vector including a 1 for the intercept 
term, the actual market return for day t, and the actual 
industry return for day t, and 
(4) 
X the Tx3 matrix of original observations from the regression 
period. 
Once the prediction intervals were computed for each separate firm for 
each day mentioned above, the actual firm return Rit was compared with 
the interval. Any return falling outside of the prediction interval 
could be considered abnormally large. In this way abnormal return 
behavior on a firm-by-firm basis can be inspected. The quantities of 
returns falling outside of the respective intervals are given in 
16 
Appendix A for each treatment firm and are discussed in the next chapter. 
Once the ratio of returns falling outside of the prediction inter-
vals to the total intervals covering the 33 day period is determined, 
a test for the significance of a proportion may be conducted. The 
expected proportion of returns falling outside of the related intervals. 
is 0.05 since the prediction intervals were constructed at the 95 
percent level of confidence. Possible violations of the assumptions 
underlying this test are discussed in the limitations section of 
Chapter IV. Out of 1,000 intervals investigated, 50 abnormally large 
returns could be expected. The null hypothesis is H0 : No significant 
difference between the actual proportion of returns falling outside of 
the confidence intervals and the expected proportion of 5 percent. The 
test statistic is given by: 
z p.- .05 
; .osc~-.os) 
where p = the actual proportion of returns falling outside of the 
related prediction intervals to the total prediction 
intervals, N, covering 33 days per firm. 
The results of the test for the significance of a proportion are 
reported in Chapter III, Findings. 
(5) 
The individual firm analysis allows for the detection of widespread 
impact even though the timing of the impacts differs across firms. 
Should a small number of firms cause an aggregate measure to be 
significant, the individual-firm-analysis will detect such outliers. 9 
Aggregate Analyses 
Several conventional aggi.·egate analyses were conducted on the 
17 
abnormal return behavior of the samples. These include visual analyses 
and statistical tests. The visual inspections include plottings of the 
average absolute residual (AAR) and the def lated average absolute 
residual (DAAR) for the treatment sample and control sample against 
(a) trade days and (b) CRSP days. 
CRSP days are used as an alternative to trade days because of the 
possible lack of simultaneity, on a trade day basis, of market reaction 
to firm specific subjective data. In other words, several firms' 
returns might be abnormally large on a given calendar day even though 
that calendar day represents different trade days relative to the 
disclosure dates of the firms. Such a phenomenon might show up when 
plotting abnormal returns against calendar days (CRSP days) while not 
showing up in a plot of abnormal returns against trade days. 
The average absolute residual (AAR) is given by: 
1 s 
~.t = S E 
i=l 
I u. I, and it 
the deflated average absolute residual (DAAR) is given by: 
D~,t 
9 See (."::heyara and Boatsman (1980) for an example of the effect of 
outliers on aggregate. measures. 
(6) 
(7) 
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where k ;;:: T for treatment sample and C for control sample, 
s total number of firms in the sample, 
A 
!u. I = !Rit - Rit I for each security i on day t, and it 
Eiuiti = mean of all regression period absolute residuals for 
150 
firm i (i.e., L: luitj/150). 
t=l 
The results of the plottings are presented in Chapter III, Findings. 
Tests for significant differences between DAA~,t and DAARC,t' were 
conducted for t = CRSP days. The results of these t-tests are presented 
in the findings chapter for each year 1978 and 1979. 
The Jaffe Portfolio Method 
For Signal Event II (1979 disclosures), the Jaffe Portfolio Method 
(1974) is used, since an expectation model can be specified for the 
second filing of RRA data. Ohlson (1979, p. 526) suggests that the 
Jaffe fest is powerful since "there is every reason to believe that the 
signals in his study are uncorrelated and, thus, firm-specific." 
In order to specify an expectations model of RRA income, the 
predictability of the components of RRA income must be investigated. 
The disclosure of RRA income actually presented in most firms' 10-K's 
was comprised ()f (1) the present value of new additions to reserves, 
(2) the accretion of discount on past recognized reserves, (3) the 
effect of price changes, and (4) the effect of changes in quantities 
which were estimated in prior years. Consider the predictability of 
each of these components. Major additions to reserves (i.e., new finds) 
are reported by the press well before the filing of 10-K data. Analysts 
should be able to estimate the present value of these new finds based 
on some average recovery rate and current prices. The r.~sult is that 
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the new additions component of RRA income should be predictable with 
minimal error, given that estimated quantities are reported prior to 
RR.A data. The accretion of discount components of RRA income is totally 
predictable. 10 The effect of price changes should be predictable to 
some extent since the price changes are generally announced in the 
national news and recovery rates can be estimated. The only component 
which might not be predictable is the changes to prior quantity esti..,.; 
mates. These changes were generally lumped in the "Other" category in 
RR.A supplemental disclosures for 1979. For these reasons, the expecta-
tion model used when applying the Jaffe method was: 
where (Y ) RRA t+l 
RR.At 
RRA income for 1979, 
value of proven reserves at the end of 1978, 
r = 10 percent mandated discount rate, 
(8) 
actual 1979 RRA income attributable to new discoveries~ 
and 
Pt+l =actual -1979 RR.A income attributable to price changes. 
This expectation model is used to determine a buy/sell short strategy 
for the Jaffe method. 
If RRA valuations are perceived by the market to be superior, then 
the (rational) market will adjust previous valuations in the same 
direction .(i.e., up or down) as the unexpected RRA gain or loss. There-
fore, the following assumption is required when applying the expectation 
model in equation (8): 
lOA . . f d. ccretion o iscount = .10 (beginning proven reserves value). 
20 
(9) 
where (YRRA)i,t+l = actual RRA income for firm i, 1979, 
E(YRRA)i,t+l = expected RRA income for firm i, 1979, and 
= actual abnormal return for security i experienced 
during the information disclosure period. 
The Jaffe Portfolio Method constructs portfolios of stocks which 
are presumed to be held on a calendar day t of an appropriate signal 
period. A different portfolio t is constructed for each day t to be 
considered. The total number of portfolios depends on the length of 
the signal period under consideration. An average abnormal return is 
computed for each portfolio t. The result of applying equations (8) 
and (9) is to multiply (-1) times the u. for firms that disclosed a l.t 
reduction in RRA under the category of "Other" and to leave unchanged 
the sign on u. for firms that disclosed a positive amount in "Other". l.t 
If the expectation model holds, the result of its application would be 
to increase the value of portfolio returns by changing negative returns 
to positive returns, based on the assumption that a negative unexpected 
change, had it been fully anticipated, would have resulted in a short 
sale. Each portfolio t average abnormal return, u. , is standardized 
. l.t 
by dividing by an estimated standard deviation of portfolio t abnormal 
11 
returns. Finally, the standardized abnormal returns for each 
portfolio t are averaged across all portfolios. 
11The estimated standard deviation is given by: 
where T - total number of observations (days) taken prior to ·day t, 
-
U - abnormal performance of portfolio t on day t-k. it,t-k -
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The standardized abnormal return for each portfolio t is a measure 
of the number of standard deviations contained in the mean abnormal 
return, u. . If no systematic signal effect occurs, it is reasonable it 
to assume that some portfolio average abnormal returns will be positive 
and some will be negative. Moreover, the average of the standardized 
portfolio returns should approximately equal zero. 
There is ample evidence that the residual of a security on one day 
is uncorrelated with the residuals of that security (or any other 
security) in subsequent days. Therefore, the standardized residuals 
can be treated as independent observations because each portfolio t 
contains only residuals measured on day t. So the test statistic: 
se 
-- ~ t(V), V = 
1rP 
(T-l)P degrees of freedom (10) 
where se = average standardized portfolio mean residual, 
P total number of portfolios, and 
T total number of observations used to derive each portfolio,'s 
standard deviation. 
The hypothesis to be tested is: 
H0 : se < O 
HA: se > 0 
The test statistic given by equation (10) will be used to determine 
whether the magnitude of the residuals occurring near Signal Event II 
(i.e., se). could have arisen by chance. 
The results of applying the various methodologies discussed in 
this chapter are presented next. 
/' 
CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS 
Individual Firm Analysis 
For each firm in the 1978 and 1979 treatment samples, two regres-
sions were run--a time series ordinary least squares simple linear 
regression (using one explanatory variable--the market equally-weighted 
index) and a time series ordinary least squares multiple linear 
regression (using two explanatory variables--the market equally-weighted 
index and an industry equally-weighted index made orthogonal to the 
market index). Some of the statistics which were computed in addition 
to the individual-firm regressions are: 
1) R2 - market index only 
2) R2 - dual-index model 
3) Increase in R2 due to inclusion of Industry Index 
4) t calc for 61 for testing HO: f\ 0 
5) t calc for Bz for testing HO: Bz = 0 
6) First Order Autocorrelation of Residuals 
7) Durbin-Watson d statistic for testing for significant 
autocorrelation of residuals 
8) Number of actual firm returns falling outside of 33 prediction 
intervals 
A 
9) B1 and B2 for the dual index model 
The firm-by-firm data are presented in Appendix A. A summary of this 
data appears in Table I. For the late filing firms for 1978, 17 out of 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF FIRM-SPECIFIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
Returns 
Falling Returns 
Significanta Outside of Falling Rang" of 2 
Significant Non-Signific11nt or Prediction Within Increase in R 
Industry Industry Inconclusive Non-Significant Intervals Prediction Resulting !rom 
Index Index Autocorrelation Autocorrelation (33 Investigated} Intervals Inclusion of 
Total % Total % Total x Total x Total % Total % .-tndustry,lndex 
.!2J!: 
Late Filing Firms 17 33% 34 67% 14b 27% 37 73% 123 7% 1,560 93% 0.0 thru .076 
On-Time Filing Fir111s 
__!!. fil ll 78% ..1.r; .!1!. ll m ~· _!% hill. 94% O.O thru .096 
Total 1978 Sample 25 29% 62 71% 21 24% 66 76% 191 7% 2,680 93% 0.0 thru .096 
.!.222.1 
Negative Return& Expected 39 74% 14 26% 14d 26% 39 74% 178 10% 1,571 90% 0.0 thru .167 
Poaitive Return• Exp•cted 23 82% 5 18% 3•, 11% 25 89% 83 9% 841 91% ,004 thru .199 
Expectation Not Obtainable 2 100% ~ ...Q! ~ ...Q! 2 100% _l 2! __..!! 98% .037 thru .061 
Total 1979 Sample 64 '77% 19 23% 17 20% 66 80% 262 10% 2,477 90% 0.0 thru .199 
8 Inconclusive Durbin-Watson d'• are: 1978 Late Filers, 5; 1978 On-Time Filers, 2; 1979 Negative Returns Expected, 21 1979 Positive letunis 
Expected, I. 
bOf the 14 aignif ic11nt autocorrelations, 9 were decreased and 5 were increased by inclusion of the induatry index. 
c • 
Of the 7 significant autocorrelations, 4 wore decreased and 3 were increased by inclusion of the industry index. 
d • ' 
Of the 14 a1gnif icant autocorrelations, 8 were decreased and 6 were increaaed by incluaion of the industry index, 
•of th• 3 significant autocorrelations, 2 were decreased and l vaa increaaed by incluaion of the indu1try index. 
N 
w 
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51 (or 33 percent) of the t-statistics relating to s2' the coefficient 
on the industry index, were significant at the .05 level. 
For the entire treatment sample of firms for 1979, 64 out of 83 
(or 77 percent) of the t-statistics on s2 were significant at the 
5 percent level. The length of the time series used to generate the 
1978 industry index was 487 returns while for 1979 the length was 800 
returns. It seems that the longer time series was more useful in 
constructing the industry index. An alternative.explanation for the 
superiority of the 1979 industry index is that the market index may 
have accounted for less of the variance of firm returns in 1979 than 
in 1978. 2 The average R for the market-index-only model for 1978 was 
2 . 2 . 
. 2139 compared with the 1979 R of .1998. The average R 's for the 
dual-index model was .2300 and .2604 for 1978 and 1979 respectively. 
Based on these results, it appears that part of the superiority of the 
1979 industry index is due to the increase in the length of the time 
series used to generate of 1979 industry index, and part is due to a 
decrease in the explanatory power of the market index for 1979. The 
. ' R2 d average increase in s ue to inclusion of the industry index was .0161 
and .0606, or 7.5 percent and 30.3 percent for 1978 and 1979, 
respectively. 
2 Inspection of Table I reveals that the maximum increase in R for 
1 1978 was .096 while for 1979 the maximum increase was .199. Twenty-
four percent of the 1978 regression models and 20 percent of the 1979 
1Lev (1979) reported that the average R2 for oil and gas firms in 
his sample, using daily data, was .18. The inclusion of an industry 
index could conceivably double the R2 for any given firm, and in fact 
did double the R2's for several firms in this current study (see 
Appendix A) . · 
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models experienced significant, or inconclusive, first order autocot-
relation based on the Durbin-Watson d statistic at the 5 percent 
. 'f. 1 1 2 s1gn1 icance eve . However, the addition of the industry index 
decreased the first order autocorrelation for 23 .of these models while 
i~creasing the autocorrelation for the other 15 models. In summary, 
an industry-index can significantly add to the explanatory power of the 
market model, even after the index has been made orthogonal to the 
market index. 
The firms comprising the industry index are listed in Appendix B, 
along with summary statistics of the ·regression results from creation 
of the index. For 1978, the market index explained .5914 of the 
variance in the industry index. The standard deviation of the regres-
sion was .0098, with no significant first order autocorrelation of the 
residuals. For 1979, the R2 was .6582 with a standard deviation of 
.0103 and significant first order autocorrelation of .1909. 
Test for Significance of a Proportion 
As discussed in the previous chapter, individual-firm-analysis 
of abnormal return behavior might be warranted when the researcher has 
reason to believe that market reaction to some subjective information 
may not be instantaneous or simultaneous across firms. Table I 
presents the results of a comparison, on an individual-firm basis, of 
actual firm returns with prediction intervals covering the 33 day 
2The Durbin-Watson test statistic is given by: 
d 
T 
" 1A A )2 
'" tuit - ui,t-1 
t=2 
t 
A 2. 
E uit 
t-1 
period from 2 days prior to the RRA disclosure date through 30 days 
after such date. For the 51 late filing firms in 1978, 123 of the 
1,683 returns (Or 7.31 percent) fell outside of the related prediction 
intervals. A proportion of 5 percent would be expected since each 
daily prediction interval was constructed usi~g a 95 percent level of 
confidence. Table II contains the computed Z-statistics for tests of 
significance of a proportion for several subsamples and intervals. 
The 33 day period is divided into a disclosure date period covering 
the 6 days from 2 days prior to the disclosure through 3 days after, 
and a post-disclosure period covering the remaining 27 days. For the 
late filers mentioned above, the Z-statistics for each period are 
significant at the 1 percent level (the tabular Z value for 1 percent 
and two tail areas is 2.576). It can therefore be concluded that a 
larger-than-expected number of firm returns were abnormally large in 
magnitude for the late-filing firms around the 1978 disclosure dates. 
None of this abnormal return behavior should have been influenced by 
the 10-K incremental information since the Form S's were, for the most 
part, filed 60 to 90 days after the 10-K's. 
Closer inspection of Table II reveals highly significant Z 
statistics for 1979 during the 6 day disclosure period. 3 Some may 
argue that these results include not only RRA information, but also 
incremental 10-K information filed concurrently with the RRA data. 
(The 1978 on-time filers' proportions were not significant.) If we 
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look at the post-disclosure period for the 1979 firms, the Z statistics 
3All 1979 individual firm results are presented separately for 
firms with negative unexpected RRA income, as discussed previously 
under the Jaffe Portfolio Method, and firms with positive unexpected 
adjustments. It is interesting that the firms disclosing negative 
adjustments are so highly significant. 
TABLE II 
PROPORTIONS OF FIRM RETURNS FALLING OUTSIDE OF RELATED PREDICTION INTERVALS AND 
CORRESPONDING Z STATISTICS 
6 Trade Days 27 Trade Days Trade Days 
-2 thru 3 4 thru 30 -2 thru 30 
Ppns Z calc Ppns Z calc Ppns 
1978: 
Late Filers 28/306 3.331 95/1,377 3.233 123/1,683 
On-Time Filers 15/216 1.311 53/ 972 .648 68/1,188 
Totals 43/522 3.394 148/2,349 2.892 191/2,871 
1979: 
Negative Adjustments 61/318 11. 604 117 /1,431 5.513 178/1,749 
Positive Adjustments 27/168 6.584 . 56/ 756 3.037 83/ 924 
Totals 88/486 13.258 173/2,187 6.245 261/2,673 
Z calc 
4.345 
1.145 
4.063 
9.935 
5.555 
11. 302 
N 
-....J 
are still significant at the 1 percent level, indicating a possible 
lag in the timing of market reaction. 
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Appendix C contains a frequency count of returns falling outside 
of prediction intervals for the 33 trade days. The frequencies appear 
rather uniform throughout the periods. It can be concluded from the 
results presented in Table II that a larger-than-expected proportion of 
returns fell outside of the prediction intervals for all subsamples 
except the on-time filers of 1978. 
Aggregate Analyses 
Several aggregate analyses were conducted on the samples, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The first of these analyses to be 
discussed here is aggregated residual inspection. The average absolute 
residuals (AAR) (see equation (6)) were plotted against trade days for 
the 1978 late filing firms and on~time filing firms. These plots are 
given in Figures 1 and 2. The trade days included in the plot run 
from 5 days prior to the disclosure date through 20 days after the 
disclosure date. For the late filers (Figure 1) spikes (abnormally 
large returns) appear to have occurred in the few days immediately 
prior to disclosure. It has been determined that these spikes are 
caused by fewer than 5 firms. More importantly, medium-sized spikes 
seem to have occurred during the several days after disclosure before 
starting to taper off·somewhere near trade day 12 or 13. Caution 
should be exercised when interpreting these plots. First we must 
realize that each trade day's AAR represents an average of the absolute 
value of residuals of all sample firms experiencing a trade on that 
day. If r·eaction to _the subjective data is not simultaneous across 
all firms, we could expect that a small number of firms,. -would account 
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for any one trade day's magnitude. Only individual firm analysis 
• 
would detect widespread non-simultaneous reaction. The comparable 
plotting for the on-time filers for 1978 (Figure 2) shows spikes in 
the few days prior to the disclosure date and a spike approximately 
18 days after disclosure. For both Figures 1 and 2 the pre-disclosure 
date spike could have resulted from RRA data and/or, for the on-time 
filers, from incremental 10-K information. Baskin (1972) observed that 
the date a regulatory organization stamps a document as received lags 
the actual release date of the information. Therefore, reaction 
occurring a few days prior to the date a document is stamped "received" 
could be a result of market efficiency vis-a-vis, leakage. On-time 
filers were the only subsample that did not test significant with 
regard to the prediction interval proportion analysis. 
One problem with inspecting the AAR's is the difficulty of 
ascertaining how the residuals compare with expected residual magni-
tudes. Therefore, the late filers and on-time filers AAR's were 
deflated by dividing by the expected value of the residuals (the mean 
of the regression period absolute residuals). The plots of these 
DAAR's appear in Figures 3 and 4. Minimal abnormal return behavior 
would be evidenced by a DAAR near the unit level (1) which has also 
been plotted in Figures 3 and 4 for reference. For the late filers, 
the lag in market reaction through day 10 becomes more apparent. The 
plot of DAAR's for on-time filers clearly depicts a lack of market 
reaction. 
An alternative to plotting residuals against trade days is to 
aggregate residuals for calendar (CRSP) days. Should firms experience 
price reaction on the same calendar day, but different trade days, a 
plotting against CRSP days would reveal this occurrence. Al.so, 
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plotting against CRSP days permits a comparison of control firms with 
treatment firms. Such comparisons are impossible on a trade day basis 
since control firms have no disclosure date. 4 
In order to decide what CRSP days should be.plotted, frequency 
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tables were prepared indicating the frequency of firms having trade days 
(15 days prior to, through 30 days after, the disclosure date) for given 
CRSP days. Based on the frequency tables, it was decided that for 1978 
late filers, the period from CRSP date 4248 through 4290 would include 
enough firms for meaningful analysis. For on-time filers, the CRSP 
dates chosen were from 4180 to 4231. For 1979, the use of frequency 
data resulted in the choice of the interval 4441 through 4480. The 
intervals chosen for control firms are 4248 through 4290 for 1978 and 
4441 through 4480 for 1979. All of these CRSP dates are cross-
referenced with associated calendar dates in Appendix F. These choices 
ensured the following minimum number of firms per CRSP day: 
1978 - Late Filers 
1978 - On-Time Filers 
1978 - Control Firms 
1979 - Treatment Firms 
1979 - Control Firms 
Minimum Frequency 
Per CRSP Day 
40 
18 
12 
65 
12 
For 1978, the plottings of DAAR's against CRSP days appear in 
Figures 5 through 7. The configurations for the two treatment sub-
samples are similar to the DAAR plottings against trade days. The 
4The AAR for control firms is computed in the same fashion as the 
AAR for treatment firms. Twenty of the treatment firms were used to 
construct an industry index for use in control firm regressions. 
Upon running the dual-index models for control firms u was determined 
A ct 
by uct Rct Rct 
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late filers experienced spikes from dat 4248 through day 4267 while the 
on-time filers experienced some early spikes and some late spikes. The 
plot for control firms in Figure 7 reveals a mostly random series of 
5 
residuals around the unit level. 
A comparison of the late filers treatment subsample an<l the control 
firms sample DAAR's is given in Figure 8. CRSP day 4250 should be 
ignored (see footnote 5). Evidence of treatment sample market reaction 
comes in the form of divergence of the two series plotted. Divergence 
occurs on days 4267, 4268, 4269, 4274, 4278, and 4281. 
In an effort to ascertain the significance of the various diver-
gences of late-filers DAAR' s from Control Firms' DAAR' s, t-tests for 
equality of the treatment and control means were conducted for each 
CRSP day using firm deflated absolute residuals as observations. 
Table III contains the six days the null hypothesis of equality of 
6 
means is rejected at the 10 percent significance level. Other days 
where probabilities of greater JtJ were close to 10 percent are 4256 
(p 0.1260), 4274 (p = 0.1418), 4283 (p = 0.1469), and 4286 
(p 0.1752). These t-tests provide more rigorous evidence than the 
plot in Figure 8 regarding the divergence of the DAAR's for treatment 
vs. control firms. Based on these plottings of 1978 residuals, it 
appears as tho~gh the late filing_ firms did experience widespread 
abnormal return behavior around the RRA disclosure dates, whereas the 
5the spike on day 4250 is the result of one control firm's 
extremely high abnormal return--Consolidated Oil and Gas experienced 
a -return on this day in excess of 0 .10. 
6For some of the CRSP days the null hypothesis of equality of 
variances of the two samples was rejected at the 10 percent level of 
significance. (An F (folded) statistic was computed to test for 
equality of variances.) For these days the t-statistic was approxi-
mated, using Satterthwaite's approximation of the degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 8. Plot of Late Filers' vs. Control Firms' DAAR 
Against CRSP Days 4248 through 4290 (1978) w· l.O 
firms that filed on-time (the 10-K included RRA data) did not experience 
such widespread behavior. 
TABLE III 
SIX SIGNIFICANT CALENDAR DAY TREATMENT MEANS FOR 1978 
CRSP Day t-calc Prob > ltl · 
4264 2.2101 0.0322 
4267 2.6637 0.0098 
4268 2.4230 0.0213 
4269 1.8993 0.0642 
4279 2.2060 0.0319 
4281 2.5248 0.0146 
Comparable plottings were prepared for the treatment and control 
samples for 1979 and the plots appear in Figures 9 through 13. The 
configurations are not that different from the 1978 plots. The 
treatment firms experienced spikes for the two trade days prior to 
disclosure date zero and some lingering up through the seventh day 
after such date. The plot of the treatment firms' DAAR against CRSP 
days (Figure 11) displays a spike around day 4449 and the deflated 
residuals remain above the unit level for the most part through day 
4480. In contrast, the control firms deflated residuals (see Figure 
12) appear to fluctuate randomly around the unit level. It can be 
concluded from Figures 11, 12, and 13 that the general tendency was 
for the treatment firms DAAR's to stay above the unit level while the 
control firms DAAR's were predominantly below the unit level. 
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Figure 11. Plot of Treatment Firms' DAAR Against 40 
Consecutive CRSP (Calendar) Days Around 
Disclosure Dates (1979) 
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Figure 12. Plot of Control Firms' DAAR Against 40 
Consecutive CRSP (Calendar) Days Corre= 
sponding to the Treatment Firms' Plot 
in Figure 11 (1979) 
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As with 1978, t-tests of the null hypothesis of equal means were 
conducted for each CRSP day 4441 through 4480. Deflated firm absolute 
residuals were used as observations for the tests. Table IV contains 
11 CRSP days where there was a significant difference between the mean 
treatment deflated absolute residual and the mean control def lated 
absolute residual at the 10 percent significance level. 7 
TABLE IV 
ELEVEN SIGNIFICANT CALENDAR DAY TREATMENT MEANS.FOR 1979 
CRSP Day t-calc Prob > !ti 
4441 1.6868 0.0985 
4448 2.9454 0.0048 
4449 3.5184 0.0021 
4451 2.1683 0.0383 
4453 1.8465 0.0756 
4456 2.9800 0.0054 
4464 2.6036 0.0111 
4467 4 .1387 0.0001 
4473 4 .1384 0.0002 
4477 2.4258 0.0194 
4478 4.9475 0.0001 
In addition to these significant days, some other days where the 
probability of a greater absolute value of t are near 10 percent are 
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days 4462 (p = 0.1351) and 4463 (p = 0.1419). It can be concluded that 
even if some incremental 10-K effect was experienced near the disclosure 
7 . 
Again, where the Folded F statistic indicated unequal variances, 
an approximate t-calc was used. 
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dates, the treatment sample experienced a lingering effect when compared 
with the control sample. 
Test for Joint Occurrences 
The t-tests conducted above indicate some abnormal return behavior 
on a daily basis. However, a number of significant t-statistics should 
be expected to occur randomly. In order to determine if the number of 
significant t-statistics across the disclosure periods is larger than 
expected, inferences involving the probability of joint occurrence of 
the t' s over the periods should be made. Simonds and Collins (1978)8 
have utilized a joint probability calculation based on the premise that 
the sample mean of individual firm F scores computed for n firms is well 
approximated by x2 (n)/n. Gheyara and Boatsman (1980) adopted this 
procedure using t-statistics as opposed to F scores. The sampling 
. 2 2 
distribution of the mean of t 's is approximated by X (n)in for n 
individual t-statistics. An underlying assumption required by this 
approximation is that the individual t-statistics be independent obser-
vations. Gheyara and Boatsman (1980) discussed a possible lack of 
independence in their t-statistics due to cross-sectional correlation 
of returns. In contrast, the t-statistics computed above relate to 
individual days instead of individual firms. Ample prior evidence has 
indicated that returns are serially uncorrelated. The results of 
individual firm regre·ssions which were presented in this study indicated 
a minor number of firms experienced first order autocorrelation in the 
8simonds and Collins (1978) adopted the method based on Merrington 
and Thompson (1943). 
residuals. Therefore, the t-statistics reported above should be 
relatively independent. 
The test statistics and critical values (.05 significance level) 
are given below for the joint probability assessments: 
Mean of Squared t-statistics 
(43 obsns. for 1978; 40 obsns. for 1979) 
Critical Value (.05 significance level) 9 
1978 1979 
1.507 
1.373 
3.266 
1.387 
The probability of drawing samples of 43 or 40 t 21 s with means greater 
than 1.373 and 1.387, respectively, given that the t-statistics are 
independent, is .05. It can therefore be concluded that the observed 
mean t 21 s of 1.507 and 3.266 are significantly larger-than-expected, 
48 
indicating the joint occurrence of significant abnormal return behavior 
across the periods investigated. 
Jaffe Portfolio Method 
As mentioned previously, one of the more powerful methodologies 
for assessing abnormal return behavior is the Jaffe (1974) portfolio 
method. Under the Jaffe method, daily portfolios of individual firm 
returns which are signed based on an expectations mbdel are constructed. 
The standardized mean return for any portfolio should be independent of 
other portfolio standardized means since the returns comprising any 
daily por~folio are serially uncorrelated with the returns of a 
different day's portfolio. 
9The formula for the critical value is 
2 
Xc/n) 1 2 
-- = - (Z + lzn-1) • 
n 2n a 
n = 43 and 40 for 1978 and 1979 respectively and z.OS = 1.645. 
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Two decisions requiring researcher judgment are necessary prior to 
conducting the Jaffe test. The first is development of an expectation 
model. Discussion of the expectation model to be applied in the current. 
study was given in the previous chapter. 
The second decision requiring researcher judgment involves choosing 
an appropriate portfolio holding strategy. Initially it was assumed 
that stocks were purchased (or sold short) four days prior to, and 
liquidated 20 days after the disclosure d~te; The long holding period 
was chosen in an effort to capture price reactions which might have been 
lagged (i.e., not instantaneous) due to the high degree of imprecision 
inherent in the RRA estimates. For each firm the 25 CRSP (calendar) days 
associated with this holding period were identified. A frequency count 
of the total number of firms in each CRSP (calendar)-day portfolio 
revealed that, of 53 total portfolios, 24 contained 11 securities or less 
(see Appendix D). In order to ensure a satisfactory sample size for 
each portfolio,· these 24 days (and corresponding portfolios) were 
dropped. The result of dropping these days was to adopt a holding 
strategy of slightly less than 25 trading days around the disclosure 
10 date for 23 of the 81 firms in the treatment sample. The remaining 
29 portfolios contained an average of 65 firms each, with the smallest 
portfolio containing22 firms. These 29 portfolios are related to CRSP 
dates 4445 through 4473 (see Appendix F for associated calendar dates). 
The expectation model discussed in Chapter II was applied to all 
firm returns in each of the 29 portfolios. The result of its applica-
tion was to change the sign of each return when the unexpected RRA 
l OF · · . · d d 1 d d f d . irms experiencing non-tra e ays were exc u e rom correspon ing 
daily portfolios. This contributed to the problem of sparse portfolios. 
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income ("Other") was negative. If market reaction was widespread across 
treatment firms, and if the expectation model predicts well, the effect 
of applying the model would be to significantly increase 'the total value 
of the portfolios. The mean of the 29 untreated -portfolios was .00064 
while the mean of the treated portfolios was .00106, or 65 percent 
higher than the untreated portfolios. The change in the mean of the 
portfolios was in the predicted direction. Appendix E contains the 
portfolio mean returns before and after standardization. After each 
portfolio had been divided by related portfolio standard deviations, 
the effect of the expectation model was to increase the overall 
standardized mean by 247 percent (from -.1075 to .1584). Of the 1,894 
total untreated firm returns in all portfolios, 1,013 were negative and 
881 were positive. After treating all returns with the expectation 
model, 916 returns were negative and 978 were positive. Of the 29 total 
untreated portfolio means, 16 were negative and 13 were positive. After 
application of the model 12 were negative and 17 were positive. 
In order to test for significance, a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-
Ranks Test was conducted. The resulting observed Z-statistic was -1.049 
which is associated with a one-tailed probability of occurrence under 
H0 : No difference in treated vs. untreated portfolio means of p = .147. 
Although the change in the mean value of the portfolios was in the right 
direction, the significance of the application of the expectation model 
is weak as measured by the Wilcoxon test. In order to inspect visually 
the results of applying the expectation model to firm returns, the 
untreated and treated portfolio means were plotted in Figure 14 and the 
respective standardized portfolio means were plotted in Figure 15. 
Inspection. of both figures reveals that the effect of applying the 
expectation model was to eliminate the large negative portfolio returns 
thereby increasing the overall mean. 
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Once the expectation model was applied, and each of the 29 port-
folios were constructed, 29 portfolio standard deviations were computed 
for use in standardizing the portfolio means. In order to compute a 
portfolio standard deviation, the residuals of all firms which are 
members of a portfolio are averaged for each day of a regression period. 
Eighty consecutive regression period residuals were used. The mean 
daily residuals are portfolio returns for each of the 80 days. These 
80 observations were then used to compute a standard deviation for the 
portfolio. Appendix E contains the portfolio means before and after 
standardization. The overall mean of the standardized portfolio means 
was 0.1584. The resulting computed t-value; was 0.853 with 2,291 
associated degrees of freedom. The related tabular t-value is .842 
at the 0.20 level of significance and 1.036 at the 0.15 level of 
significance. The probability of observing a larger t value, given 
that the mean portfolio standardized return is really less-than-or-
equal-to-zero is approximately 20 percent. These results should be 
interpreted cautiously. Of the 29 portfolios, 25 contained at least 
64 firms. If reaction to the RRA data was not simultaneous across 
calendar days, the smaller firm-returns would tend to bring down the 
larger returns resulting in daily mean portfolio returns which are 
small. The Jaffe test may not be an appropriate test when many port-
folios are considered. 
Since the early CRSP-day portfolios contain firm returns on or 
near the 10-K filing dates, the Jaffe test was applied to a subset of 
the 29 portfolios. Portfolios were chosen which contained firm trade 
days of not less than 3 days after the 10-K filings. Portfolios 4453 
through 4473 comprised the 21 members subset for the additional test. 
Contrary to the notion of incremental 10-K effects, the computed 
t-statistic increased to 1.17 which is significant at the 0.15 level. 
The increased significance resulting from the subset of portfolios 
indicates that (1) the original results based on 29 portfolios was 
not due solely to incremental 10-K information, and (2) the subset of 
portfolios in the post-filing period were more singif icant than all 29 
portfolios. In fact, the portfolio with the largest positive 
standardized mean was the latest portfolio co.rresponding ·to CRSP day 
4473 (the standardized mean was 1.8079). The related trade days of 
firms in portfolio 4473 were primarily in the range of 16 to 20 days 
subsequent to the 10-K filing. 
In summary, the Jaffe test produced results which were inconclu-
sive. However, when the notion of RRA subjectivity and possible lack 
of simultaneity of market reaction is considered, the observed 
significance levels of the two tests become more palatable. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the research conducted, at least two observations can be 
made. First, inclusion of the industry index in the market model 
significantly contributed to the predictability of firm-specific 
abnormal returns. Seventy-seven percent of the industry index coeffi-
cients from firm-specific models for 1979 tested significant at the 
0.05 level of significance. The industry index was related in a linear 
fashion to the corresponding individual--firm returns of 64 companies 
for 1979. 
Second, the research indicated that widespread abnormal return 
behavior occurred contemporaneously with the treatment firm disclosures. 
Almost every treatment-sample firm experienced actual returns falling 
outside of 5 percent prediction intervals near the disclosure dates for 
both 1978 and 1979. Should this contemporaneous occurrence be construed 
as a cause-effect relationship, it can be concluded that the market 
found RRA disclosures useful even in the light of its inherent subjec-
tivity. Tests for the significance of proportions indicated that the 
frequency of occurrence of actual returns falling outside of the related 
5 percent prediction intervals was indeed abnormally high. 
Various aggregate analyses were conducted for the disclosure 
periods and all but the Jaffe method indicated that significant abnormal. 
return behavior occurred during the test periods. Perhaps the most 
revealing results come from the plottings of the average prediction 
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errors. The comparative plottings of treatment and control sample 
deflated average absolute residuals for 1978 and 1979 clearly depict 
the occurrence of some phenomenon in the treatment sample residuals 
that was absent from the control sample residuals. Tests of H0 : No 
difference between treatment sample vs. control sample means for given 
calendar days resulted in rejection of H0 for an abnormally high number 
of days. Even though the Jaffe method produced inconclusive results, 
possible lack of simultaneity of market reaction across firms provides 
a rationale for explaining the tempered results. 
Assuming that the contemporaneous occurrence of RRA disclosure and 
abnormal return behavior is due to a cause-effect relationship, an 
explanation as to why RRA might provide superior information is needed. 
As discussed previously, most of the data provided by the RRA supple-
mental disclosures is available to the investing public prior to its 
formal disclosure in the 10-K. Significant discoveries of oil are 
reported in the financial press as they occur. Price changes usually 
are reported in both financial periodicals and on nationwide news 
broadcasts. Accretion of discount is totally predictable. The sole 
element of RRA disclosures which seems to be unpredictable is the 
"revision of prior estimates" component. Two sources of information 
would be contained in this component--revision of estimated quantities 
of proved reserves and revision of management's estimated rate of 
future production. These elements would be of use to both short-run 
and long-run investors. Of course, this information could be provided 
via quantity disclosures only. This study is not concerned with 
seeking the appropriate mode of disclosure. Management would seem to 
have a comparative advantage over financial analysts and the investing 
public at estimating production rates and reserve quantities. Therefore 
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the information could be perceived as superior even though it is 
highly imprecise when compared with ultimate actual amounts. 
Limitations 
The results discussed above are subject to the following limita-
tions. The control sample used in the numerous plottings and in the 
t tests of equality of treatment vs. control sample means contained a 
smaller number of observations than did the treatment sample. As a 
result, the levels of confidence associated with the control sample 
means as estimates of population means of daily returns is lower than 
the levels of confidence corresponding to the treatment sample means. 
However, this effect should be mitigated by an increase in the estimated 
(pooled) variances which were computed for the t tests. 
Many of the statistical tests applied in this study require 
(1) cross-sectional independence of prediction errors, and (2) the 
normal distribution of daily returns. Smith and Dyckman (1981) 
criticized Lev's (1979) use of confidence intervals to make inferences 
regarding abnormal stock return behavior due to possible violation of 
these two assumptions: 
Due to the influence of an industry £actor or other 
relevant variables omitted from the market model, it 
is highly unlikely that return prediction errors for 
a given day are independent (p. 963). 
Daily returns have been shown to conform to a fat-
tailed leptokurtic distribution, departing substantially 
from the normal distribution (pp. 963-964). 
Violation of the independence assumption should be less likely in the 
current study since (1) an industry factor was included in the 
individual-firm regression models and (2) 33 consecutive prediction 
intervals (each daily return should be serially uncorrelated with all 
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other daily returns for a given firm) were computed for each firm. Lev 
(1979) computed only 7 intervals per firm and found a larger than 
expected-by-chance number of deviations from the confidence intervals 
for only two days. The prediction errors for these two days would not 
be cross-sectionally independent, and due to the insufficient number of 
days, Lev did not take advantage of the absence of serial correlation 
among daily returns. 
Regarding the violation of the normality assumption, it has been 
shown that the distribution of the t statistic is relatively stable for 
populations that are non-normal but possess a mound-shaped probability 
distribution (see Mendenhall (1975), p. 217). Also, significant results. 
were observed consistently across the many tests applied in this study. 
Anot~er limitation of the study involves the inability of the 
expectation model to significantly increase the values of the Jaffe 
portfolios, even though the model did produce changes in the predicted 
direction. The lack of significance could be attributed to (1) mis-
specification of the model, (2) lack of simultaneity of market reaction, 
and/or (3) the long holding period adopted for the test. 
Additionally the R21 s for the individual firm models were in most 
cases below 0.40 indicating the notorious inability to predict a daily 
"normal" return. 2 The average R 's across firms was 0.2300 and 0.2604 
for 1978 and 1979 respectively. 
Finally, none of the applied methodologies explicitly incorporated 
the notion of subjectivity. Although lack of instantaneous and simul-
taneous reaction was discussed, none of the tests included expectations 
of lagged reactions due to expected degrees of subjectivity of the firm 
specific RR.A data. 
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Future Research 
The results of this study highlight the need for imp?rtant future 
research. An explicit theory of the relationship between the degree of 
subjectivity inherent in data and possible lagged market reactions upon 
its disclosure needs to be formulated into a practically applicable 
methodology. Continued research is needed to improve the "normal 
return" measurement process, thereby improving the reliability o'f the 
abnormal return measure. Also, additional research is needed regarding 
the appropriate use of individual-firm analyses vis-a-vis aggregate 
analyses in information content studies. 
In summary, on-going research should be conducted in an effort to 
improve the reliability of the market test methodologies currently in 
use. The researcher's inability to specify an appropriate measure of 
normal returns would ultimately lead to incorrect inferences regarding 
abnormal return behavior. The results of this research illustrate that 
inclusion of an additional parameter in the "market model" can lead to 
significant improvement in the measurement of firm-specific abnormal 
returns. For some firms the precision of normal return measurement 
nearly doubled. It might be appropriate for researchers to abandon 
the general use of the market model and use different firm-specific 
normal return models across sample firms. Use of the market model in 
this study· for the years 1978 and 1979 resulted in R21 s of less than 
0.10 for 19 different firms' daily returns. For these firms all but 
10 percent of any daily return would, on average, be measured as an 
abnormal return. Should the same model be used for all firms when, for 
one firm tbe R2 is 0.50 and for another firm the R2 is 0.003? Future 
research should address this question. 
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APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX A 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EACH FIRM IN THE 
1978 AND 1979 TREATMENT SAMPLES 
65 
For 1978, the late filing firms (filing Form 8 amendments) are 
listed separately from the on-time filers. For 1979, the sample is 
divided dependent on the sign of the unexpected RRA income, based on 
66 
the expectation model adopted for the Jaffe Portfolio Method~ 
Significant, or inconclusive autocorrelation, determined by application 
of the Durbin-Watson d statistical test, is indicated by (S+) or (S-). 
A plus means inclusion of the industry index increased the first order 
autocorrelation whereas a minus indicates a reduction in autocorrelation 
resulting from inclusion of the industry index. The number of returns 
falling outside of prediction intervals was determined by inspecting 
the 33 returns and intervals covering the period from two days prior 
to the disclosure date through 30 days after that date. 
TABLE v 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FROM INDIVIDUAL-FIRM REGRESSIONS--1978 
R2 
Dual Index Model 
First N~;i;-,;r-of 
Market Market Index Industry Index Order Returns Falling 
Markt>t and t-Statistic t-Statistic Durbin- Auto- Outside of 
Index Industry Significant Significant Watson cori'elation 95% Prediction 
e1 e2 1978 Late Filing Firms Only Indexes Increase t-value (5%) t-value (5%) d Statistic of Residuals Intervals 
Adobe Oil and Gas .232 .281 .049 7.274 s 3.151 s 2.244 -.1467 3 1.7219 .8054 
Amerada Hess .379 .432 .053. 9.506 s 3.714 s 1.920 .0312 5 1.4112 • 5406 
A.~erican Petrofina .044 .046 .002 2.614 NS .537 NS 2.089 -.0464 4 .3316 .0709 
A<;uitainc Co. of Canada LTD .048 .049 .001 2. 723 NS -.364 NS 1.973 .0113 0 • 5721 -.0850 
Arka~sas-Louisiana Gas .203 .247 .044 6.141 s 2.944 s 1.989 .003 2 .6528 .3033 
B.:.truch-Fustcr .008 .009 .001 1.097 NS .461 NS 2.780(S+) -.3961 1 .5990 .2434 
Belco Petroleum .297 .298 .001 7.916 s ,295 NS 1.946 .0247 11 .9925 .0393 
Buw Valley Inds. .243 .280 .037 6.888 s 2.751 s 2.063 -.0385 2 2.0275 .8077 
Euttes Gis and Oil .332 .387 ,055 8. 5'17 s 3.637 s 2. 349 (I+) -.2228 3 2 .1359 .9497 
Can3dian Merrill LTD .14 7 .149 .002 5.049 s .524 NS 2.095 -.0493 0 1. 1606 .1292 
Canadian Sup~rior Oil .038 .099 .061 2.420 s 3.146 s l.443(S-) .2767 0 .3931 .4523 
Chiertain Development Co. .234 .260 .026 6.723 s 2.255 s 1.840 .0753 3 1.8321 .6558 
Citil.:!:i s~rvice .238 .244 .006 6.780 s -1.064 N's 1.925 .0343 4 .5108 .,..0911 
Conoco .318 .353 .035 8.311 s 2.813 s 1.922 .0255 2 1.0701 .3665 
Cri..•vn Cc.ntral Petroleum. .084 .084 -- 3.677 s -.302 NS 1.945 .0253 7 .8104 -.0717 
Damson Oil .166 .166 -- 5.426 s -.155 NS 2.409(S-) -.2159 1 1.7157 -.0527 
Duo~ Pet ruleum .151 .166 .015 5.135 s 1.600 NS 1. 821 .0876 6 1.1848 .3807 
Exx0n .339 • 351 .012 8.709 s 1.647 NS 2.255 -.1321 i .7336 .1439 
Felr.iont Oil .286 .287 .001 7.705 s .241 NS 1.896 .0363 l 1.3469 .0460 
Getty Oil .221 .246 .025 6.472 s 2.211 s 1.953 .0192 5 1.0151 .3509 
Gulf Oil .199 .218 .019 6.069 s 1.892 NS 2.173 -.0966 1 .6662 .2133 
HuJsons Bay Oil and Gas .040 .041 .DOI 2.491 s -.310 NS 2.252 -.1270 2 .3712 -.0499 
foperial Oil .139 .157 .018 4.886 s 1.794 NS 2.222 -.1161 2 .7833 .2748 
lni:!xco Oil .377 .453 .076 9.473 s 4.516 s 2.592(S-) -.2973 3 2.1596 .9878 
Louisiana Land & Exploration .266 .270 .004 7.331 s .851 NS 2.312(1-) -.1579 4 .9205 .1146 
Marathon Oil .234 .237 .003 6. 725 s .775 NS l.585(S-) .2059 6 • 7709 .0947 
Mi!sa Petroleum .256 .281 ,025 7 .140 s 2.256 s 1.840 .0800 4 1.0174 • 3381 
Hobil Corp. .288 .289 .001 7.736 s .475 NS 2.257 -.1289 4 .6544 .0439 
Mountain Fuel Supply .308 .318 .010 8 .125 s 1.411 NS 2.053 -.0270 2 .9680 ; 1775 
Murphy Oil .247 .253 .006 6.976 s 1.008 NS I. 971 .0135 0 1.4862 .2346 
Nator::as .447 .488 .041 10.945 s 3.403 s 2.041 -.0230 4 .1.5891 .5028 
Ne1,.":!lont Mining .180 .194 .014 5.690 s -1. 602 NS 2.151 -.0851 1 .8992 -.2836 
Oc~i<l~ntal Petroleum .279 .300 .021 7 .572 s 2.105 s 1.916 .0348 4 1. 1375 .34&9 
Phillips Petroleum .173 .174 .001 5.558 s .475 NS 1.855 .0696 2 .0641 .0568 
Pioneer Corp-Texas .254 .254 -- 7.095 s -.108 NS 2.131 -.0606 3 .7740 -.0120 
°' "-.I 
TABLE v (Continued) 
R2 
Market Market Index 
Market and t-Statistic 
Index Industry Significant 
1978 Late Filing Firms Only Indexes Increase t-value (5%) 
Quaker State Oil Refining _ .288 .295 .007 7.741 s 
Ranger Oil Canada .336 .355 .019 8.660 s 
She 11 Oil .16Q .160 
--
5.304 s 
South~rn Natural Resources .118 .136 .018 4.439 s 
Standard Oil of California .346 .346 -- 8.842 s 
Sta~J3rd Oil of Indiana .239 .244 .005 6.827 s 
Stanoard Oil of Ohio .231 .249 .018 6.674 s 
Sun Oil .172 .172 .001 5.538 s 
Sundance Oil .173 .218 .045 5.580 s 
Su~triur Oil .258 .276 .018 7.175 s 
Tc!nneca .155 .158 .003 5.212 s 
Texaco .142 • J 73 .031 4.943 s 
Texas Gas Transmission , 109 .112 .003 4.254 s 
T~xJs International .239 .270 .031 6.823 s 
Union Oil of California .253 .259 .006 7.088 s 
Wicnita Industries .258 .258 
-- 7.169 s 
1978 On-Time Filing Firms 
Am~rican Natural Resources .073 .076 .003 3.414 s 
Apache .260 .262 .002 7.209 s 
Atlantic Richfield .266 .302 .036 7.325 s 
Barber Oil .117 .117 
--
4.431 s 
British Petroleum .003 .005 .002 -.6223 NS 
C & l< Petroleum .346 .442 .096 8.856 s 
Canadion Homestead Oils LTD .133 .222 .089 4. 769 s 
Charter .255 .260 .005 7 .119 s 
Clark Oil and Refining .229 .232 ,003 6.6211 s 
Coastal .288 .299 .Oil 7.740 s 
Cons.:>l idatcd Natural Gas .143 .146 .003 4.970 s 
Crystal Oil .220 .235 .015 6.454 s 
Dellii International .225 .225 
--
6. 547 s 
Diarn~nd Shamrock .226 .229 .003 6.574 s 
Flori(la Gas .192 .196 .004 5. 937 s 
General Exploration .131. .153 .022 4.713 s 
Industry Index 
t-Statistic Durbin-
Significant 'Watson 
t-value (5%) d Statistic 
1.185 NS 1.935 
2.054 s 2.122 
.023 NS !. 912 
-l.793 NS 2.256 
.218 NS 2.053 
.909 NS 1.618(5-) 
1.878 NS 1.862 
.553 NS 1.946 
2.891 s 2.430(S-) 
1.928 NS 1.580($-) 
-.759 NS 2.004 
2.344 s 2.331(1+) 
-.656 NS 2.017 
2.503 s 2.368(1+) 
1.074 NS l.658(I-) 
.296 NS 2.375(5+) 
-.696 NS 2.057 
.689 NS 2.274 
2.740 s 2.091 
-.248 NS 1.940 
-.6225 NS 1.831 
5,021 s 2.145 
4.083 s 2.176 
.965 NS 2.279 
.763 NS 1.787 
1.510 NS 2. 221, 
.750 NS 1.881 
l.724 NS 2.098 
• 2115 NS 2.356(1-) 
-.691 NS 2.088 
-.776 NS 2.188' 
1.993 s 2.593(S+) 
Dual Index Model 
First Number of 
Order Returns Falling 
Auto- Outside of 
correlation 95% Prediction 
111 of Residuals Intervals 
.0305 3 1. 2558 
-.0641 2 1. 7019 
.0429 2 .6479 
~.1321 0 .4958 
-.0293 3 .8179 
.1878 0 .5288 
.0668 0 1.0168 
.0208 1 • 5414 
-.2189 0 1. 69 73 
.2062 l .6960 
-.0060 l .4538 
-.1664 l .6378 
-.0098 l .4131 
-.1943 0 2.0529 
.1684 5 .6185 
-.1899 1 2.9576 
-.0361 l .3501 
-.1372 2 l.2781 
-.0484 0 .7990 
.0244 4 .5376 
,0825 s. -.0865 
-.0763 1 2.2798 
-.0890 l 1.4769 
-.1439 8 2.0541 
.1046 3 l. 3814 
-.1134 l 1.7156 
.0586 0 .4233 
-.0542 2 I. 4600 
-.1868 2 1.61<83 
-.0464 0 1.1552 
-.0965 11 . 7052 
-.2982 l 1.8618 
82 
.2058 
.4175 
.0028 
-.2283 
.0205 
.0811 
. 2967 
.0534 
.8625 
.1992 
-.0716 
.3088 
-.0712 
• 7653 
.0998 
• 120 I 
-.0774 
.1370 
.2993 
- •. 0341 
-.0724 
1.2664 
1.1825 
.2903 
.1720 
.3623 
• 0&48 
.4213 
.0594 
-. It.Ob 
-. JOSI 
.7951 
0\ 
OJ 
TABLE v (Continued~ 
R2 
Market Market Index 
Market and t-Statiatic 
Index Industry Significant 
1978 On-Time Filing Firms Only Indexes Increase t-value (5%) 
H0uston Oil and Minerals .183 .201 .018 5.757 s 
Husky Oil .022 .032 .010 1.819 NS 
Juniper Petroleum .121 .121 -- 4,508 s 
Kerr-McGee ,21(.l .245 .Oll 6.887 s 
Kirby Exploration .320 .320 -- 8.349 s 
North...,·est Energy .226 .234 .008 6.579 s 
Nur:::.ac Oil and Gas LTD .181 .214 .033 5.718 s 
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline .223 .224 .001 6.522 s 
Pennzoil .307 ,308 .001 8.105 s 
Reading and Bates .383 .386 .003 9.578 s 
Reser\·e Oil and Gas .290 ,327 .037 7. 771 s 
Santa Fe International .272 .272 
--
7.431 s 
Southern Union .045 .046 .001 2.640 s 
Texas Eastern .238 .132 .005 6.792 s 
Total P~trol~um North America LTD .294 .343 .049 7.860 s 
TrJnsco Companies .251 .254 .003 7.047 s 
United Energy Resources .240 .245 .005 6.841 s 
Wair.co Oil .173 .173 -- 5.561 s 
Wilshire Oil of Texas .200 .226 .026 6.085 s 
Wvvds Petroleum .122 .139 .017 4.540 s 
Industry Index 
t-Statistic Durbin-
Significant Watson 
t-value (5?.) d Statistic 
1. 799 NS 2,497(S+) 
1.223 NS 2.066 
.117 NS 2.502(8+) 
1.460 NS 1.902 
-.145 NS 1.874 
1.182 NS 1.845 
2 .475 s 1.823 
.261 NS 2.057 
.228 NS 1.959 
.866 NS 2.004 
2.842 s 2.187 
.285 NS 1.897 
-.399 NS 2.292(1-) 
1.003 NS 1. 779 
3.291 s 2.096 
.708 NS 2.101 
.963 NS 1.614(5-) 
.235 NS 2.178 
2.224 s 2. 597 (S-) 
1.709 NS 1. 797 
Dual Index Model 
First Number of 
Order Returns Falling 
Auto- Outside of 
correlation 95% Prediction 
of Residuals Intervals 
-.2541 0 
-.0332 0 
-.2597 0 
.0487 4 
.0582 0 
.0714 5 
.0816 1 
-.0288 1 
.0183 0 
-.0035 0 
-.1213 1 
.0502 6 
-.1512 0 
.1025 2 
-.0520 1 
-.0928 l 
.1838 0 
-.0928 1 
-.3078 2 
.0859 I 
Bl 
1. 5943 
.8483 
2.0147 
.8651 
1. 7122 
.7120 
1.6110 
• 5752 
.8770 
1.5246 
1.4530 
1.2037 
,4098 
.7908 
2.2187 
1. 3441 
.8092 
1.3848 
1. 7242 
1.0511 
Bz 
,4988 
• 5681 
.0525 
.1893 
-.0332 
.1391 
.7097 
.0249 
.0262 
.1504 
.5455 
.0519 
-.0690 
.1246 
.9355 
.1325 
.1216 
.0598 
.6534 
.4028 
°' \0 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FROM INDIVIDUAL-FIRM REGRESSIONS--1979 
R2 
Market Market Index Industry Index 
Market and t-Statistic t-Statistic Durbin-
1979 Firms Index Industry Significant Significant Watson 
(Expectations• Negative) Only Indexes Increase t-value (5%) t-value (5%) d Statistic 
Adobe 011 and Gas .093 .095 .002 3.884 s .663 NS 2.396(8+) 
Amerada Hess .197 .264 .967 6.022 s 3.661 s 2.016 
Ar!lerican Petrofina .156 .177 .021 5.235 s -1.916 NS l.619(S+) 
.Apache .248 .331 .083 6.980 s 4.271 s 1.973 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas .229 .233 .004 6.631 s .887 NS 1. 564 (S+) 
Bl~lcv Petr0lcum .189 .314 .125 5.848 s 5.201 s 1.817 
B0w Valley Inds LTD .144 .158 .014 4.982 s 1.583 NS 2.147 
C & K Petroleum .135 .189 .054 4.808 s 3.125 s 2.001 
Chieftain Development LTD .216 .259 .043 6.391 s 2.920 s 2 .121 
Cities Service .180 .258 .078 5.697 s 3.939 s 1.906 
Consolidated Natural Ga• .220 .220 
--
6.454 s .324 NS 1. 817 
Cr0•'fl Central PetroleUlll ,165 .202 .037 5.410 s 2.625 s 1.858 
Cryst3l Oil .275 .347 .072 7.485 s 4.039 s 2.056 
Dome Petroleum LTD .051 .103 .052 2.825 s 2.917 s 2.039 
Exxon .221 .306 .085 6.477 s 4.233 s 1. 758 
Felmont Oil .353 .409 .056 8.981 s 3. 727 s 1.867 
Getty Oil .205 .312 .107 6.180 s 4. 777 s 1. 621 (S-) 
Hudsons Bsy Oil and Gas LTD .139 .243 .104 4.888 s 4.487 s 1.749 
Imperial Oil LTD .248 .283 
--
6.987 s 2.680 s 1.488 (S-) 
Juniper Petroleum .296 .387 .091 7.880 s 4.687 s 2.065 
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas .078 .082 .004 3.538 s . 772 NS 1.812 
Kerr-~cGee .273 .322 ,049 7.458 s 3.242 s 1.992 
Louisiana Land & Exploration .094 .132 .038 3.919 s 2.530 s 2.050 
Marath0n Oil .257 .406 .149 7.154 s 6.075 s 1.984 
Mesa Petroleum .071 .238 .• 167 3.352 s 5.678 s 1.989 
Mobil .181 .335 .143 5.726 s 5.837 s 2.068 
Mountain Fuel Supply .129 .136 .017 4.685 s 1. 717 NS 2.044 
Murphy 0 ll .277 .326 .049 7.531 s 3. 270 s 1.983 
Occidental PetroleU11 .161 .263 .102 5.325 s 4.509 s 2.125 
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline .176 .191 .015 5.613 s 1.656 NS 1. 503(5-) 
Pennzoil .173 .269 .096 5.563 s 4.398 s 2.125 
Phillips Petroleum .228 .354 .126 6.612 s 5.367 s 1.992 
Pio11eer Corp-Texaa .230 .246 .016 6.656 s 1. 761 NS l.619(S-) 
R.rng~r Oil C.a.nnda LTD .261 .331 .070 7.235 s 3.919 s 1. 778 
Reading and Bates .234 .263 .029 6. 730 s 2.372 s 1.640 (I-) 
Dual Index Model 
First Number of 
Order Returns Falling 
Auto- Outside of 
correlation 95% Prediction 
of Residuals Intervals 
.-.2088 4 
-.0109 0 
.1865 3 
.0100 z 
.2148 12 
.0876 1 
-.0755 4 
-.0047 0 
-.0732 6' 
.0403 4 
.0907 4 
.0682 3 
-.0336 0 
-.0307 0 
.1170 3 
.0484 3 
.1805 2 
,1207 6 
.2477 4 
-.0357 l 
,0906 1 
.0013 it 
-.0470 l 
-.0018 2 
-.0031 3 
-.0462 7 
-.0229 1 
.0041 2 
-.0670 4 
.2458 2 
-.0651 4 
-.0006 7 
.1890 2 
.1108 2 
.1627 2 
ei 
.9503 
I. 3998 
1.0772 
1. 8229 
.9427 
1. 3550 
1.5132 
I. 7786 
1. 9606 
.8924 
• 7799 
1. 6 762 
2.0133 
1.1108 
.7414 
1. 8555 
1.1112 
. 9271 
1. 3229 
2.5067 
.6550 
.9636 
1.0144 
I. 3621 
.8447 
1. 2274 
1.0292 
1. 3209 
1. 2 599 
.6151 
1.1620 
. 9591 
1.1436 
1.8733 
.1.4228 
82 
.1106 
.5742 
-.2675 
.7312 
.0842 
• 74 53 
.3259 
• 7726 
.6197 
.3774 
.0267 
.5335 
.699-'· 
.766) 
.3054 
.5105 
.5475 
.5403 
.3411 
.%51 
.0906 
.2849 
.4368 
.7102 
.8603 
.7558 
.2637 
.3689 
.7005 
.1194 
.5870 
• 5054 
~ 2072 
.6585 
.3366 
--..J 
0 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
R2 
Market Market Index Industry Index 
Market and t-Statiatic t-Statistic 
1979 Firm~ Index Industry Significant Significant 
(Expectations • Negative) Only Indexes Increase t-value (5%) t-value (5%) 
Scurry Rainbo~ Oil LTD .102 .124 .022 4.098 s 1. 913 NS 
Southern Natural Resources . 1611 .171 .010 5.320 s 1.347 NS 
Southern t:nion .147 .160 .013 5.056 s 1.513 NS 
Standard Oil of Indiana .305 .400 .095 8.064 s 4.816 s 
Sun 011 .304 .374 .070 8.040 s 4.051 s 
Sundance Oil .173 .205 .032 5.573 s 2.410 s 
Superior Oil .213 .304. .091 6.333 s 4.376 s 
Supron Energy .226 .276 .050 6.572 s 3.181 s 
Tenneco .423 .448 .025 10.410 s 2.608 s 
Tex.~1co .271 .350 .079 7.422 s 4.214 s 
Tex3s Gas Transmission .150 .183 .033 5. ll5 s 2.413 s 
Texas International .072 .075 .003 3.377 s .703 NS 
Transcontinental Oil .191 .247 .056 5.913 s 3.296 s 
Union Oil of California .249 .321 .072 7.007 s . 3.959 s 
l'ni.ted Energy Resources .238 .276 ,038 6.805 s 2.752 s 
'Wainco Oil .070 .159 .089 3 .346 s 3.941 s 
Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas .305 .317 .012 8.057 s 1.644 NS 
Woods Petroleum • 211 .257 .046 6.289 s 3.035 s 
1979 Firms 
(Exeectations • Positive) 
Arr!erican Natural Resources .145 .155 .010 5.009 s 1.341 NS 
Aquitaine Co. of Canada LTD .181 .234 .053 5.715 s 3.208 s 
Atlantic Richfield .222 .388 .166 6.504 s 6.305 s 
Barber 011 .045 .049 ,004 2.645 s .757 NS 
Buttes Gas and Oil .176 .216 .040 5.618 s 2.748 s 
Charter .080 .124 .041 3.595 s 2.614 s 
Coastal .336 .425 .089 8.652 s 4.788 s 
Coriuco .250 .339 .089 7.023 s 4.459 s 
Delhi International Oil .174 .201 .027 5.588 s 2.222 s 
Dianond Shamrock .301 .326 .025 7.981 s 2.330 s 
Gulf Oil .197 .309 .112 6.016 s 4.899 s 
Houston Oil & Minerals .188 .264 .076 5.849 s 3.903 s 
Husky Oil .218 .235 .017 6.425 s 1.818 NS 
Dual Index Model 
First Number of 
Order Returns Falling 
Durbin- Auto- Outsl.de of 
Watson correlation 95% Prediction 
d Stati•tic of Residuals Intervals 
1.826 .0854 0 
1. 765 .1100 9 
2.416(5+) ..:.2196 6 
1.346(5-) .3252 6 
l.689(I-) .1508 2 
1.969 .0117 4 
l.565(S-) .2059 5 
2 .153 -.0910 2 
1. 911 .0381 1 
1.878 .0206 5 
1. 939 -.0002 5 
2.157 -.0877 0 
2.429(S+) -.2262 2 
l.616(S+) .1911 3 
1.822 .0865 12 
2.083 -.0466 1 
2.271 -.1582 l 
2.212 -.1098 3 
1.874 .0553 4 
1. 746 .1224 1 
1.857 .0657 6 
1.999 -.0004 0 
2.375(5+) -.2018 0 
1.959 .0207 0 
1.836 .0631 11 
l.894 .0453 3 
1.809 .0904 4 
2.329(1-) -.1655 2 
2.0830 -.0419 7 
2 .157 
-.0853 1 
2.143 
-.0792 2 
131 
1.4321 
.7979 
.9206 
.7876 
1. 1087 
l.8661 
1. 2629 
1.6818 
l.1570 
.99!;1 
.8754 
1. 26 77 
2.0292 
!.2b92 
1.04~·~ 
I. 4124 
2.4524 
l.3B03 
.6839 
1.6452 
. 7872 
• 7214 
1.9620 
2.0113 
1. 7259 
.9697 
1. 9001 
1.4257 
1.0692 
1.5234 
1.1449 
132 
.4027 
.1369 
.1854 
.2882 
.3692 
.5631 
.5386 
.5381 
.2049 
.3839 
.2685 
.1839 
.8057 
.l(Ji 2 
• 27b2 
1.oee1 
• 37~ g 
.4381 
• lZF,5 
.5891 
.4628 
.1503 
.6797 
.9524 
.6149 
.3951 
.5101 
.2817 
.52~8 
.6765 
.2208 
....... 
..... 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
R2 
Market Market Index Industry Index 
M.arket and t-Statietic t-Statistic 
1979 l'iPU Index Industry Significanc Significant 
(El<pect1tion1 • Poeit1ve) Only Indexu Increase t-value (5%) t-vnlue (5:t) 
Inexco Oil .238 .393 .155 6.793 s 6.139 s 
Kirby Exploration .13,3 .177 .044 4. 770 s 2.791 s 
Natomas .240 .412 .172 6.842 s 6.555 s 
Nevmont Mining .174 .182 .008 5.580 s 1.176 NS 
N0rth~est En~rgy .252 .278 .026 7.069 s 2.286 s 
Pogo Producing .209 .248 .039 6.250 s 2. 763 s 
Quaker State Oil Refining .232 .245 .013 6.684 s 1.577 NS 
S3nte Fe International ,234 .280 ,046 6.732 s 3.043 s 
Shell Oil .254 .315 .061 7.094 s 3.637 s 
Standard Oil of California .159 .299 .140 5.282 s 5.437 s 
Standard Oil of Ohio .234 .433 .199 6. 726 s 7 .181 s 
Texas £.;.1::>tern .179 .231 .052 5.677 s 3 .156 s 
totJl Pctrohum North America LTD .190 .279 .089 5.890 s 4.257 s 
Transco ,264 .296 .032 7.281 s 2.574 s 
Wichita Industries .109 .162 .053 4.253 s 3.040 2 
1979 Firms 
iEXEectation; • Unobtainable) 
Baruch-Foster .160 .221 .061 5.304 s 3.388 s 
Crcstm~mt Oil a.nd Gas .217 .254 .037 6.402 s 2.710 s 
Dual Index Model 
First Number of 
Order Returns Fallirg 
Durbin- Auto- Outside of 
Wataon correla ~ion 95~ Pr.,diction 
d StntiStic of Resid1Jal& Intervals 
2.209 -.1056 l 
1.998 .0002 4 
2.084 ·-.0496 3 
1.943 .0151 4 
2.022 -.0108 6 
2.084 -.0444 s 
2 .174 -.0903 2 
1.965 .0067 4 
!. 598 (S-) .1ee3 I 
l. 954 .0201 1 
1.782 .1074 5 , 
1.923 .0313 3 
2.059 -.0462 1 
l. 833 .0801 1 
2.215 -.1144 l 
2.078 -.0429 0 
1.848 .0730 1 
A 
e1 
1.6904 
1. 34 73 
1.5305 
1. 19 79 
1.6121 
1.4903 
2.0813 
1.4265 
l.ocr,z 
.8347 
1.1556 
• 7350 
I. 7 5 76 
I. 4 762 
1.7934 
2.6081 
2. 7227 
~ 
tlz 
.9273 
.5350 
.8479 
.1684 
• 34 75 
.4644 
.3264 
.4397 
.3621 
.SYJ9 
.7172 
.2828 
• 79'>2 
.3481 
.9023 
1.1405 
.7513 
-...J 
N 
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COMPOSITION OF INDUSTRY INDEX 
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TABLE VII 
COMPOSITION OF INDUSTRY INDEX 
Firms Used to Derive Industry Average: 
Asamera Oil LTD 
Ashland Oil 
Barnwell Industries 
Burns (R.L.) 
Consolidated Oil and Gas 
Damson Oil (1979 Only) 
Dorchester Gas 
General American Oil of Texas 
Great Basins Petroleum 
Helmerich & Payne 
Holly 
Houston Natural Gas 
Lear Petroleum 
McMoran Oil and Gas 
Mitchell Energy & Development 
OKC 
Patrick Petroleum 
Petro-Lewis 
Tesoro 
Texas Oil and Gas 
Triton Oil and Gas 
Universal Resources 
Industry Index Summary Statistics: 
1978 
Coefficient of Determination 
(R2 from Industry Average Regression on Market Index) 
Standard Deviation 
Durbin-Watson d 
(Not significant at 5 percent) 
First Order Autocorrelation of Residuals 
1979 
Coefficient of Determination 
(R2 from Industry Average Regression on Market Index) 
Standard Deviation 
Durbin-Watson d 
(Significant. at 5 percent) 
First Order Autocorrelation of Residuals 
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Fiscal Year End 
3-31 
9-30 
9-30 
7-31 
11-30 
9-30 
8-31 
6-30 
7-31 
9-30 
7-31 
7-31 
9-30 
6-30 
1-31 
9-30 
4-30 
6-30 
9-30 
8-31 
5-31 
10-31 
.5914 
.0098 
1. 693 7 
.1532 
.6582 
.0103 
1.6175 
.1909 
APPENDIX C 
TRADE DATES FOR RETURNS FALLING OUTSIDE 
OF PREDICTION INTERVALS 
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TABLE VIII 
TRADE DATES FOR RETURNS FALLING OUTSIDE OF PREDICTION INTERVALS 
1978 1979 
Trade Late On-Time Negative Positive No 
Date Total Filers Filers Adjustments Adjustments Adjustments 
-2 24 4 3 13 4 
-1 36 9 2 17 8 
0 15 2 1 9 2 1 
1 20 4 3 9 4 
2 17 5 3 6 3 
3 20 4 3 7 6 
4 16 7 1 3 5 
5 14 5 2 4 3 
6 19 8 1 9 1 
7 20 6 3 7 4 
8 12 4 1 5 2 
9 10 4 2 4 0 
10 11 4 2 4 1 
11 11 3 1 3 4 
12 10 3 0 3 4 
13 13 5 0 6 2 
14 14 2 3 7 2 
15 10 1 3 3 3 
16 13 5 1 4 3 
17 12 1 4 6 1 
18 9 1 3 4 1 
19 9 4 1 2 2 
20 10 2 3 2 3 
21 9 2 3 1 3 
22 9 2 3 3 1 
23 11 4 3 1 3 
24 9 1 1 3 4 
25 7 0 2 5 0 
26 13 5 0 7 1 
27 13 7 2 3 1 
28 14 3 2 7 2 
29 7 1 2 4 0 
30 16 5 4 7 0 
Totals 453 123 68 178 83 1 
APPENDIX D 
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CRSP 
Day 
4433 
4434 
4435 
4436 
4437 
4438 
4439 
4440 
4441 
4442 
4443 
4444 
4445 
4446 
4447 
4448 
4449 
4450 
4451 
4452 
4453 
4454 
4455 
4456 
4457 
4458 
4459 
4460 
4461 
4462 
4463 
4464 
4465 
4466 
4467 
4468 
4469 
4470 
4471 . 
4472 
4473 
4474 
TABLE IX 
FREQUENCY TABLE OF FIRMS WITH -4 THROUGH 20 TRADE DAYS 
ACCUMULATED ON A CRSP DAY BASIS 
Frequency 
of Firms 
(with 
78 
Trade Days Cumulative Cumulative 
-4 through 20) Frequency Percent Present 
1 1 0.051 0.051 
1 2 0.051 0.101 
1 3 0.051 0 .152 
1 4 0.051 0.202 
1 5 0.051 0.253 
1 6 0.051 0.303 
2 8 0.101 0.405 
3 11 0.152 0.556 
4 15 0.202· 0.759 
4 19 0.202 0. 961 
6 25 0.303 1.265 
11 36 0.556 1.821 
31 67 1.568 3.389 
72 139 3.642 7.031 
69 208 3.490 10.521 
75 283 3.794 14.315 
76 359 3.844 18.159 
74 433 3.743 21. 902 
69 502 3.490 25.392 
69 571 3.490 28.882 
70 641 3.541 32.423 
77 718 3.895 36.318 
77 795 3.895 40.212 
78 873 3.945 44.158 
71 944 3.591 47.749 
68 1,012 3.440 51.189 
69 1,081 3.490 54.679 
69 1,150 3.490 58.169 
74 1,224 3.743 61.912 
71 lf295 3.591 65.503 
71 1,298 3.591 69.095 
70 1,436 3.541 72. 635 
76 1,512 3.844 76.480 
68 1,580 3.440 79.919 
67 1,647 3.389 83.308 
66 1,713 3.336 86.646 
64 1, 777 3.237 89.884 
59 1,836 2.984 92.868 
41 1,877 2.074 94.942 
31 1,908 1.568 96.510 
22 1,920 1.113 97.623 
7 1,937 0.354 97. 977 
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TABLE IX (Continued) 
Frequency 
of Firms 
(with 
CRSP Trade Days Cumulative Cumulative 
Day -4 through 20) Frequency Percent Present 
4475 8 1,945 0.405 98.381 
4476 8 1,953 0.405 98.786 
4477 2 1,955 0.101 98.887 
4478 3 1,958 0.152 99.039 
4479 5 . 1, 963 0.253 99.292 
4480 3 1, 966 0~152 99.444 
4481 2 1, 968 0.101 99.545 
4482 3 1,971 0.152 99.697 
4483 2 1,973 0.101 99.798 
4484 2 1,975 0 .101 99.899 
4485 2 1,977 0.101 100.000 
APPENDIX E 
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TABLE X 
SUMMARY PORTFOLIO STATISTICS FOR JAFFE PORTFOLIO 
Means Means Standardized Portfolio Means 
Before After Before After Cumulative 
Portfolio CRSP Expectations Expectations .Expectations Expectations Increase Increase 
Number Date Model Model Model Model (Decrease) (Decrease) 
1 4445 -0 .007766 -0.001401 -1.1964- -0.2158 0.9806 0.9806 
2 4446 0.006678 0.004577 1. 0960 0.7511 (0.3449) 0.6357 
3 4447 -0.015252 0.006263 -2.4262 0. 9962 3.4224 4.0581 
4 4448 0.010363 0.002442 1.7193 0.4051 (1.3142) 2.7439 
5 4449 0.007039 -0.007553 1.1750 -1.2610 (2.4360) 0.3079 
6 4450 -0.001820 -0.003654 -0.3048 -0.6120 (2. 3072) 0.0007 
7 4451 -0.007358 0.003329 -1. 2444 0.5630 1.8074 1. 8081 
8 4452 0.002723 -0.008423 0.4455 -1. 3945 ( 1. 8400) (0.0319) 
9 4453 -0.005102 0.006097 -0.8894 1. 0629 1. 9523 1.9204 
10 4454 -0.008988 0.005974 -1. 4841 0.9865 2.4706 4.3910 
11 4455 0.004084 -0. 001176 0.6741 -0.1941 (0.8682) 3. 5228 
12 4456 0.009263 0.000321 1.5494 0.0537 ( 1. 4957) 2. 02 71 
13 4457 -0.001985 -0.000136 -0.3259 -0.0223 0.3036 2.3307 
14 4458 -0.012657 -0.001839 -2.0616 -0.2995 1. 7621 4.0928. 
15 4459 0.006645 0.000578 1.0641 0.0925 (O. 9716) 3.1212 
16 4460 0.000879 -0.001339 0. 1455 -0.2217 (0.3672) 2.7540 
17 4461 -0.003078 0.002361 -0.5122 0.3930 0.9052 3.6592 
18 4462 -0.003936 0.000554 -0.6807 0.0958 0. 7765 4.4357 
19 4463 -0.003130 0. 001886 -0.5318 0.3204 0.8522 5.2879 
20 4464 -0.000332 -0.000289 -0.0549 -0.0479 0.0070 5.2949 
21 4465 0.005667 -0. 0020Lf 7 0.9447 -0.3412 (1.2859) 4.0090 
22 4466 -0.003350 -0.001066 -0.5740 -0.1827 0.3913 4.4003 
23 4467 -0.001572 0.003416 -0.2595 0.5640 0.8235 5.2238 
24 4468 -0.002706 0.000412 -0. 4396 0.0669 0.5065 5.7303 
25 4469 0.001136 0.000182 0 .1922 0.0307 (0.1615) 5.5688 
co 
>-' 
Means 
Before 
Portfolio CRSP' Expectations 
Number Date Model 
26 4470 -0.003459 
27 4471 0.005963 
28 4472 0.000016 
29 4473 0.003463 
Totals 
Means 
TABLE X (Continued) 
·Means Standardized Portfolio Means 
After Before After 
Expectations Expectations Expectations Increase 
Model Model Model (Decrease) 
-0.001409 -0.5843 -0.2380 0.3463 
0.002055 0.9554 0.3293 (0.6261) 
0.007798 0.0023 1. 1048 1.1025 
0.012816 0.4885 1. 8079 1.3194 
(3.1178) 4.5931 7. 7109 
(.1075) .1584 .2609 
Cumulative 
Increase 
(Decrease) 
5.9151 
5.2890 
6.3915 
7. 7109 
co 
N 
APPENDIX F 
CROSS REFERENCE OF CRSP DATES WITH 
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TABLE XI 
CROSS REFERENCE OF CRSP DATES WITH ASSOCIATED CALENDAR DATES 
Dates or Intervals 
Relating to: 
1978 On-Time Filing Firms 
1978 Late Filing Firms 
1979 Firms 
Jaffe Portfolios 
Single Dates Specifically 
Discussed in the Study--1978 
--1979 
CRSP Dates 
(or Intervals) 
4180-4231 
4248-4290 
4441-4480 
4445-4473 
4250 
4256 
4264 
4267 
4268 
4269 
4274 
4278 
4279 
4281 
4283 
4286 
4441 
4448 
4449 
4451 
4453 
4456 
4462 
4463 
4464 
4467 
4473 
4477 
4478 
Associated 
Calendar Dates 
(or Intervals) 
March 7, 1979 through 
May 18, 1979 
June 13, 1979 through 
August 13, 1979 
March 18, 1980 through 
May 13, 1980 
March 24, 1980 through 
May 2, 1980 
June 15, 1979 
June 25, 1979 
July 6, 1979 
July 11, 1979 
July 12, 1979 
July 13, 1979 
July 20, 1979 
July 26, 1979 · 
July 27, 1979 
July 31, 1979 
August 2, 1979 
August 7, 1979 
March 18, 1980 
March 27, 1980 
March 28, 1980 
April 1, 1980 
April 3, 1980 
April 9, 1980 
April 17, 1980 
April 18, 1980 
April 21, 1980 
April 24, 1980 
May 2, 1980 
May 8, 1980 
May 9, 1980 
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